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Abstract
Scientific knowledge is a symbolic system consisting o f  hypotheses, models 
and theories generated by means o f a paradigm-mediated interaction 
between a scientific community and a research domain. Such a knowledge 
generating paradigm consists o f already existing theories, as well as 
methodological and ontological beliefs or assumptions. In this article it is 
argued that the meaning ascribed to the central concepts o f  medical science 
(such as patient, disease, causality and therapy) are fundamentally 
determined by the 19th century logical positivist scientific paradigm. The 
ontological and methodological implications o f the postmodern natural 
sciences (e.g. quantum physics) have not been applied to medical science.
The 19th century ‘natural science paradigm ’ therefore acts as a meta­
theory fo r  both medical science and medical practice. However, the theo­
retical knowledge system generated by medical science acts as the theory 
fo r  the practice o f scientific clinical medicine which therefore functions with 
the same understanding o f the central concepts such as patient, disease and 
disease causality, therapy etc. The limitations o f  this paradigmatic monism 
are illustrated by an analysis o f the medical and societal response to the 
AIDS epidemic and it is concluded that medical science and practice, 
because o f  the complexity o f its research and practice domain, must accept 
in principle the possibility o f  paradigmatic pluralism (as in the social 
sciences) or should attempt to develop a holistic paradigm that will cope 
more adequately with its fields o f  research and practice.
1. Introduction
Scientific knowledge is a symbolic system generated by means o f a paradigm-
mediated interaction between a researcher or research group and an aspect of
reality (the research domain). The paradigm consists of:
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* the presently accepted theoretical beliefs o f the research community re­
garding the research domain;
* their methodological beliefs regarding the appropriate methods that can 
access their research domain to provide valid knowledge (theories) o f the 
domain, and
* their ontological assumptions regarding the domain structure. These ontolo­
gical assumptions may be consciously propagated by the research com­
munity or may be implied by the research methodology without the research 
community necessarily being conscious of the implications (see Mouton & 
Marais, 1988:125-151).
There is no possibility o f a paradigm-free, direct access to ‘reality’. The para­
digm functions very much as a world view for its adherents in that it has a regu­
lating function on their perception o f the world. It becomes institutionalized in 
social institutions such as university research departments, scientific societies, 
scientific journals, industrial research organizations, etc. As an institutionalized 
scientific world view it influences decisions by the community regarding the pro­
blems that will be investigated, how they will be investigated and what type of 
solutions (i.e. ‘theories’) will be considered to be ‘scientific’, i.e. what that com­
munity will consider to be valid scientific knowledge.
The paradigm therefore also has a fundamental influence on research funding 
either by scientific institutions themselves, or, through the political influence of 
the institutions o f science, by government and other societal funding agencies. 
Because ‘scientific research’ has become the accepted form o f rationality in 
Western societies and the accepted basis for problem solving in all spheres, the 
scientific paradigm will have an influence and impact much wider than the scien­
tific community.
The paradigm therefore has an influence not only on ‘theoretical science’ but also 
on its application in society by means o f  technology, professional practice, poli­
tical decisions, etc. in so far as these claim to be based on ‘scientific knowledge’.
In this essay I wish to explore the relationship between scientific knowledge and 
professional practice with specific reference to the medical profession. In order 
to do so I will
* give a short overview o f the history o f the natural science paradigm (natural 
science paradigm);
* explain what is meant by the natural science paradigm by setting out in 
broad outline the content o f the ontological assumptions and the metho­
dological beliefs;
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* explain how these assumptions and beliefs affected the central concepts of 
medical science, viz. that o f patient, disease, disease causality and therapy;
* explain how the natural science paradigm and medical science have, through 
the specific content given to these concepts, affected medical practice and 
propose a model o f the relationship between medical science (theory) and 
clinical medicine (practice);
* illustrate the argument with a case study o f the medical and societal re­
sponse to the AIDS epidemic within the context o f the biomedical model.
1.1 From neo-Aristotelianism to the natural science paradigm: an 
historical overview
A paradigm change involves changes not only in the theoretical beliefs (‘know­
ledge’) o f a scientific community, but more importantly in the methodological 
beliefs and ontological assumptions. This is what happened during the Enlighten­
ment when the neo-Aristotelian paradigm that dominated the intellectual life of 
the Middle Ages and formed the conceptual framework in terms o f which 
theorizing took place about the natural world (physical, biological), as well as the 
social and spiritual (religious) aspects o f life, was slowly replaced by what is now 
called the natural science paradigm.
In medical science this paradigm change was signaled by the replacement of the 
humoural theory o f disease by the cellular theory o f disease first comprehensively 
formulated by Virchov at the end o f the 19th century.
Humoural pathology postulated that the human body was made up o f four 
humours namely white bile, black bile, blood and phlegm. Health was a state of 
harmony between the humours and disease a wrong mixture o f them. Therapy 
consisted o f intervention to restore the balance. The theory was an application of 
the theory o f the four elements (earth, water, air and fire) to the working o f the 
body. The function and structure o f the body was interpreted in terms o f the 
wider cosmology -  the body was a mirror (or microcosm) o f the cosmos, the 
macrocosm. Verbrugh (1974:35) considers this theory to have been a major 
scientific achievement because a wide variety of phenomena could be understood 
and controlled within its framework. This theory served medicine from Greek 
times to the 17th century.
According to the cellular theory o f disease, disease is located in malfunctioning at 
the cellular level in one or more organs. This is the basic theory of disease with 
which scientific medicine still operates today.
The major difference between the neo-Aristotelian and the modem explanatory 
strategies lies in their understanding o f movement and of causality. For Aristo­
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telians the beginning of a process (the efficient cause) was not as significant for 
understanding the present configuration as was the final cause. The typically mo­
dem assumption is that something is explained once it can be explained in terms 
of initial conditions and forces and factors that interact according to natural laws. 
Something has been explained once it has been described as a mechanism.
Because of the explanatory and predictive power o f the developing natural 
science paradigm it was applied to the biological or life world on the assumption 
that the structure o f the life world was intrinsically the same as that o f the 
physical world and that the general principles o f the physical sciences were 
adequate to access this aspect o f reality as well. This meant that both the physi­
cal and biological sciences began to operate with basically the same paradigm. 
Although it originated as a paradigm to explain the physical world, it now became 
a natural science paradigm. The natural sciences therefore became characterized 
by a paradigmatic monism.
The natural science paradigm came to be regarded as defining the essence of 
scientific rationality and even o f rationality as such. Scientists therefore began to 
apply this paradigm to the developing human and social sciences as well.
However, during the first part o f the 20th century the limitations o f this natural 
science paradigm with regard to the human world became clear and several other 
paradigms were developed (e.g. phenomenology and hermeneutics) by different 
scientific communities working within the human sciences, thus establishing the 
paradigmatic pluralism presently characterizing the human sciences.
1.1.4 P arad igm atic  monism vs. parad igm atic  pluralism
If the paradigmatic monism o f the natural sciences is taken as normative for 
scientific rationality, then the paradigmatic pluralism o f  the social sciences often 
leads to the conclusion that the social sciences are still in a pre-paradigmatic 
phase o f  development because o f the fact that there is no discipline in which there 
is a single dominant paradigm.
Mouton and Marais (1988:150) argue that this conclusion is incorrect and is due 
to an application of Kuhn’s paradigm concept out o f context. Kuhn links the con­
cept o f a paradigm very strongly to that o f problem solving which is the major 
epistemic goal in the natural but not in the social sciences. They suggest that the 
term paradigm should therefore be understood more in a metaphorical sense when 
applied to the social sciences. There is no reason in principle for demanding pa­
radigmatic monism as a feature o f scientific rationality. The present monism cha­
racterizing the natural sciences is the result o f ‘political activity’ in the social 
institutions o f science, and is not a requirement o f ‘scientific activity’ as such.
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At the beginning o f the 20th century, physics underwent a paradigm change in the 
development o f quantum physics and its related sciences. Toulmin refers to the 
natural sciences that operate within the paradigmatic framework o f quantum 
mechanics as ‘postmodern sciences’, while the natural sciences which operate 
within the Newtonian paradigm he calls ‘modem sciences’ (Foss & Rothenberg, 
1988:164).
The physical sciences therefore also essentially have a paradigmatic pluralism. 
Although the postmodern insights are beginning to be incorporated in the frame­
work o f thinking o f the biological sciences, it has had little impact on medical 
science or practice. Systems theory seems to me to represent a possible alter­
native paradigm for the biological sciences. These developments have been set 
out diagrammatically in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Paradigm changes in the natural and human sciences
Paradigm Change ? Paradigm Change Paradigm Change
4 4 4
POSTMODERN PHYSICAL ? SYSTEMS THEORY PARADIGMATIC
SCIENCES PLURALISM
The gradual process by which medical science changed from the neo-Aristotelian 
humoural theory o f disease to the modem cellular theory o f disease, can be com­
pared to the gradual change from the Ptolemaic cosmology to the Copemican 
heliocentric theory. Foss and Rothenberg (1988) refer to this change as medici­
ne’s first revolution. They suggest that medical science did not apply the impli­
cations o f  the quantum revolution in physics and that it therefore continues to 
operate within the ‘modem paradigm’. They therefore explore the implications 
for medicine o f what they call ‘the theory o f self-organising systems’ (based on 
postmodern sciences) as an alternative paradigm referring to this as medicine’s 
second revolution. The life sciences are therefore entering a situation o f para­
digmatic pluralism as well. The human sciences have thus actually been leading 
the way in that they have been exploring the possibilities inherent in paradigmatic 
pluralism since the first quarter o f this century.
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It is now necessary to clarify the characteristics o f the natural science paradigm 
and then to show how the acceptance o f this paradigm by medicine affected the 
major concepts in medical science.
2. The natural science paradigm
As set out in section 1, a paradigm consists of:
* Methodological beliefs (directives by which to approach enquiry) and
* Ontological beliefs (directives by which to approach the world).
2.1 Methodological beliefs
The standard view o f science has changed with time following its first tentative 
formulation in the work o f Bacon. The Enlightenment ideal and understanding of 
science as a method o f gaining knowledge o f reality as it exists objectively, cul­
minated in the logical positivism o f the Wiener Kreis at the beginning o f this 
century.
Van Huysteen (1986:16) refers to logical positivistic as the first systematically 
formulated philosophy o f science and states that it is still accepted by many scien­
tists today. It definitely represents, I believe, the view o f science held by most 
medical scientists and medical practitioners working in the RSA today. I believe 
that it also represents the view o f science o f the éducated general public because 
it represents the underlying epistemology o f the academic school curriculum and 
thus influences the view o f scientific knowledge held by all school leavers.
The basic tenets o f the logical positivistic view on scientific methodology can be 
explained in terms o f  the following concepts: empiricism, verification, the unity 
o f science, objectivity and scientific method.
2.1.1 Empiricism
A basic postulate of the logical positivism is that all real knowledge is based on 
‘direct observation’ which includes observation mediated through various forms 
o f instrumentation (Van Huysteen, 1986:17). It postulates that theories can be 
based on theory free observation and that this enables an understanding o f  reality 
as it exists objectively i.e. independently o f the human observer.
Sallie McFague (quoted by Van Huysteen, 1986:15) characterizes the logical po­
sitivism very succinctly as "... the assumption that it is possible to go directly 
from observation to theory without the critical use o f models".
Logical positivism thus believes that it is possible to interact with a research do­
main directly on the basis o f observation without the critical mediation o f a para­
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digm. Methodological beliefs are considered to be self-evident truths abstracted 
from the practice o f the most advanced of the physical sciences namely physics. 
These beliefs guide the practice of ‘positivistic science’ and thus fundamentally 
influence the type o f theories that can be generated and will be recognized as 
valid.
These methodological beliefs imply corresponding beliefs regarding the ultimate 
structure o f the research domain under investigation i.e. methodological beliefs 
imply ontological assumptions.
2.1.2 Principle of verification
In terms o f the empiricist epistemological assumptions o f the logical positivism, 
propositions are considered meaningful (i.e. scientific) only if it is possible to 
state which observations o f reality could verify the proposition in question. In 
practice the only form o f verification accepted by most natural scientists is obser­
vations that are quantifiable and that are expressible in the form o f causal laws, 
i.e. only nomological explanations are considered verifiable and thus scientific. 
The ontological assumption accompanying these methodological beliefs is that 
reality is structured according to mechanistic principles expressible in terms of 
linear causality.
2.1.3 Unity of science
Implied in this empiricist view o f knowledge is that all sciences (i.e. scientific dis­
ciplines or ‘vakwetenskappe’) must have the same epistemological structure. A 
further implication is that all scientific knowledge must (eventually) be trans­
latable to the language o f the physical sciences and to that o f physics in particular 
(reductionism).
2.1.4 Objectivity
The term objectiv ity  plays an important role in the thinking o f natural scientists 
about their own practice. Within the logical positivistic conceptual framework, 
objectivity means knowledge obtained through the empirical method. It is 
thought to be free from any observer bias and a true (theory free) representation 
o f reality. Because it is ‘theory free observation’, scientific findings cannot be in­
fluenced by personal or cultural beliefs and values.
Reality is therefore assumed to be directly accessible through the scientific 
method which gives objective knowledge which is value-free, free of observer 
bias and therefore impersonal, a-cultural, generally valid, universal and timeless.
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2.1.5 Scientific method
Scientific rationality is thus identified with a specific method. This method was 
so successful, that proceeding in accord with it came to be identified with pro­
ceeding in accord with the precepts of rational enquiry in general and theoretical 
science in particular (Foss & Rothenberg, 1988:45).
Objectivity is guaranteed by the application o f this specific method. Van Niekerk 
(1992:51) calls it "a stabilized procedure" which imposes a strict cognitive disci­
pline on the researcher and legitimates it as ‘scientific’.
The method delimits what type o f questions can be asked and what types of 
answers can be given. The cognitive discipline ensures intersubjective validity. 
The method is used to generate scientific knowledge. It is also used in the pro­
cess o f verifying scientific theories. Important is the fact that the method is pu­
blic, i.e. it is open to public scrutiny because it is known to and (potentially) 
repeatable by others.
Van Niekerk (1992:50-51) characterizes the method which came to epitomize 
‘scientific rationality’, by the terms experim entation, inductive logic, verification  
and theory form ation . I will now discuss each o f these in turn.
* Experimentation
The stabilized procedure by which scientific knowledge is generated is said to 
start with the performance o f strictly controlled, public and repeatable (stabilized) 
observations called experiments (Van Niekerk, 1992:50). B y ‘repeatable experi­
ment’ is really meant laboratory experiments under strictly controlled circumstan­
ces in which essential variables are limited to measurable ones. In the experiment 
the scientist is thought to be a detached observer who has no influence on the in­
exorable logic o f the events unfolding before her (Foss & Rothenberg 1988: 45).
* Inductive logic
These experiments ‘establish the facts’ on which the theories will be based 
through the application o f the rules o f inductive logic by means o f which the 
particular judgments o f observational language are developed into generalized hy­
pothetical statements (Van Niekerk, 1992:51). Through the application o f induc­
tive logic the regularities brought to light during the experimentation are formu­
lated in the form of generaliseable hypotheses.
* Verification
The next step is to try to prove that the provisionally formulated hypothesis is 
true. This is done by finding further experimentally controllable observations
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which will verify the claims of the hypothesis. (Popper’s principle o f falsification 
is not really a fundamental departure from the general approach.)
* Theory formation
Scientific theories are therefore considered to be constructed on the secure 
foundation o f objective, value-free facts obtained by factual direct observation. If 
the testing (by verification or falsification) o f the empirical generalizations are 
successful, a new scientific law has been established which can be integrated in a 
cumulative manner in the growth of scientific knowledge. In this manner all non- 
empirical discourse can be eliminated from scientific discourse. Van Niekerk 
(1992:53) summarizes this ‘stabilized process’ as follows:
So groei die liggaam van wetenskaplike kennis deur die akkumulasie van 
ware feitelike en teoretiese oordele, dit wil sê van oordele wat op 'n alge­
meen geldige wyse die objektiewe werklikheid met sekerheid ter sprake 
bring, en waarvan die waarheidsgehalte kontroleerbaar is deur die rekon- 
strueerbaarheid van die waamemings waarop die teorie berus, sowel as van 
die logiese argumente wat die afleiding van hipoteses en teorie motiveer.
2.2 Ontological assumptions
The ontological assumptions and the methodological beliefs o f a paradigm form a 
mutually interactive network. The methodological process must be directly rela­
ted to the ontological reality that it is assumed to be able to access. To a certain 
extent, the (assumed) structure o f the ontological reality is established (created) 
by the methodological beliefs and vice versa.
The ontological assumptions of the natural science paradigm obviously grew in 
sophistication over time. So e.g. the concept o f a machine which underlies the 
mechanistic world view of the modem natural sciences, grew in sophistication as 
the sophistication o f technology developed more and more complex machines.
The basic concepts under which I wish to describe the ontological assumptions of 
the natural science paradigm are: dualism, materialism, reductionism, linear (uni­
directional) causality and determinism.
2.2.1 Dualism
Descartes’ dualism was of fundamental importance in the development o f science 
as it dichotomized the material and immaterial worlds, permitting the scientist to 
concentrate on aspects o f nature more readily subject to experimentation and 
quantification (Foss & Rothenberg, 1988:44). It thus formed (and in essence still 
forms) the essential background to empiricism. Gradually the emphasis shifted to 
the material aspects o f reality so that the immaterial came to be seen as a deri­
vative o f the material.
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2.2.2 Materialism
The natural world, which is the domain o f investigation o f the natural sciences, is 
assumed to be a complex material whole, composed o f assembled atomic parts 
which, when interacting with sufficient complexity, can form all the physical and 
biological systems that we encounter in the universe. This means that only funda­
mentally material explanations, i.e. explanations formulated in physicalist terms, 
will be considered as ‘true’ explanations.
Newtonian mechanics sanctioned the idea o f organized complexity, such as 
found in biological systems, as in principle reducible to the interaction o f its 
physical parts (Foss & Rothenberg, 1988:24).
The world view implied by the natural science paradigm presupposes what Foss 
and Rothenberg (1988:52) call ‘a single fundamental material level o f reality’. 
Higher levels o f organization do not involve ontologically new entities beyond the 
fundamental level elements o f which the given entity is comprised. Primary sta­
tus is thus conferred on matter and the material world and secondary or epiphe- 
nomenal status to the biological and mental worlds (Foss & Rothenberg, 1988: 
51). This leads to the following characteristic, namely that o f reductionism.
2.2.3 Reductionism
Reductionism is a complex concept. It indicates, as mentioned above, that com­
plex wholes exist only in terms of the interactions of their most fundamental parts. 
This has methodological implications as acceptable explanation now becomes the 
process by which a complex whole is analysed into its constituent parts and its 
behaviour explained in terms only of the interaction of those parts.
Reductionism thus implies that there is ideally a unified, physicalist language in 
whose vocabulary all events, physical, biological and mental are ultimately ex­
pressible. Only this type of explanatory discourse is thus legitimated by the natu­
ral science paradigm.
Reductionism and materialism are thus intimately linked in the natural science 
paradigm -  life, the human being and culture are, in the last analysis transient 
events, by-products o f physical organization because interacting physical particles 
governed by the laws of mechanics and thermodynamics are the ultimate stuff o f 
the universe. As late as 1981 Hull (quoted by Foss & Rothenberg, 1988:51) sta­
ted:
Today, both scientists and philosophers take ontological reduction for gran­
ted. Vitalism is dead. Organisms are ‘nothing but’ atoms, and that is that.
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2.2.4 Unidirectional causality and determinism
In the explanatory framework of the natural science paradigm, all events are 
explained in terms o f antecedent events organized in causal chains and networks 
which are characterizable in terms of universal laws which make no reference to 
the causal efficaciousness of future events or higher levels o f organization. 
Therefore all explanations must be determinate explanations.
Because of the fixation on paradigmatic monism by the natural scientific com­
munity, this type of explanation was extended to biological and social pheno­
mena. Contemporary medical reasoning in turn has borrowed its causal concepts 
from the other theoretical parts o f science in accordance with currently accepted 
explanatory goals (Maull, quoted by Foss & Rothenberg, 1988:55).
3. The biom edical model
Contemporary medical reasoning has not only borrowed its concept o f causality 
from the natural sciences, but has, by identifying itself as a natural science, taken 
over the whole of the natural science paradigm. Like the practitioners of the 
social sciences, medical scientists and practitioners found themselves "standing in 
the shadow o f the sciences as aspirants to some more perfect kind o f knowledge 
which the natural sciences in particular represent" (Max Wartofsky, quoted by 
Foss & Rothenberg, 1988:55).
The biomedical model is the model o f medical science and medical practice 
which follows from the acceptance by medical science of the natural science pa­
radigm. Because the term ‘science’ here specifically refers to the natural scien­
ces, the term science o f medicine could thus be defined as the symbolic know­
ledge system concerning the mechanisms, diagnosis, treatment or prevention of 
disease, developed according to the methodological directives and the ontological 
assumptions of the natural science paradigm.
By thus opting for a natural science framework as its only conceptual framework, 
biology in general and medicine in particular, gave up its autonomy to develop 
and employ sui generis modes of explanation, or for employing more than one 
explanatory framework as is possible within the human sciences.
The commitment to the natural science paradigm commits the medical scientist to 
a view o f the relevant research domain as one that is materialistic, deterministic, 
reductionistic and characterized by causal mechanisms, and the assumption that it 
is possible to exercise control through understanding the inherently predictable 
outcome of various actions.
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In addition, adopting the natural science methodological strategies commits the 
medical researcher to attach the same importance to conducting enquiry in a 
manner that is objective, a-cultural, a-temporal and impersonal in medicine as in 
physics or chemistry.
The biomedical model of medicine (or biomedicine) is thus the result o f applying 
the natural science paradigm as the only paradigm for understanding the human 
being in health and disease. It locks medical science and medical practice into 
both a hierarchy of natural sciences and into the methodological constraints o f the 
‘scientific method’.
3.1 Central concepts of biomedicine
The natural science paradigm thus has fundamental significance for the meaning 
attached to the central concepts o f medicine namely that o f patient, disease, di­
sease causation and therapy. I will now discuss each o f these in turn.
* The patient
The patient is understood as being essentially a biological organism which, in the 
words of Descartes, is "so built up and composed of nerves, muscles, veins, 
blood and skin, (that) though there were no mind in it at all, it would not cease to 
have the same functions" (quoted by Foss & Rothenberg, 1988:24).
This is today still the basic model o f the human being underlying the teaching of 
both the basic sciences and the clinical sciences as taught at medical schools in 
the Western world.
Descartes’ dualism sanctioned the idea of the body as a machine that can be 
analysed independently of the mind and o f the social and cultural context o f the 
person. This means that the diagnostic process abstracts the patient from his or 
her concrete existence and assumes that "the patient, conceptualized as a biolo­
gical organism, can be diagnosed in a context-free environment" (Foss & Rothen­
berg, 1988:61). Cartesian dualism was later reduced to a monistic materialism in 
which the body became primary, and psychological functions became secondary 
epiphenomena o f bodily processes. The psychological and social dimensions of 
human existence became irrelevant to the science and practice o f medicine.
* Disease and disease causation
In biomedicine disease is conceptualized as something physically wrong in an 
organ or organs which can be described as a deviation from the norm o f measur­
able biological parameters (functional or structural). Disease is thus a material 
entity and can be completely described in physicalist language. Similarly the cau­
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ses o f disease are physical factors: the presence of too much or too little of a cri­
tical substance or the presence of an intrinsically harmful agent.
Since disease is biology gone awry, and since the biological organism can best be 
understood by an understanding of its constituent parts and their physical inter­
actions, there is no need to delve further than the physical mechanisms of disease. 
In this manner the ultimate level o f explanation of disease becomes the level of 
molecular biology. To the extent that disease is strictly interpreted in physical 
terms, both research energies and research funding will be focused strictly in this 
direction.
* Therapy
Against this background it is clear that therapy will also be conceptualized in 
purely physical terms as physical intervention (chemical, electrical or surgical) 
that will compensate for the surplus or deficiency o f the critical substance or will 
neutralize the pathogenic agent.
From this analysis it is clear that the adoption o f the natural science paradigm by 
medical science has had definitive consequences for the ascribable meanings of 
scientific medicine’s central concepts.
3.2 Institutionalized forms of medical science
Although scientific medicine or biomedicine thus locates itself within the discipli­
nary matrix o f the natural sciences, there is no specific scientific discipline called 
m edicine  which would be an equivalent to the disciplines o f physics and chemis­
try in the physical sciences, or to botany and zoology in the biological sciences.
The scientific activities o f scientific medicine take place within a large variety of 
separate disciplines which include the physical sciences (e.g. medical physics, 
medical biochemistry) and biological sciences e.g. microbiology, anatomy, phy­
siology, pathology, genetics, immunology etc., as well as in the clinical disci­
plines, e.g. surgery, paediatrics etc. These clinical disciplines tend to refer to 
themselves as ‘clinical sciences’ especially within the academic environs o f uni­
versity faculties o f medicine.
In spite o f the fact that there are fundamental differences between the research 
methodologies as applied in the clinical situation (e.g. ‘controlled repeatable ex­
periments’ are in principle not possible), clinical researchers see themselves es­
sentially as ‘natural scientists’ applying the natural scientific empirical method. 
In actual fact their research process is much more closely allied to certain re­
search processes used in the social sciences in which sophisticated statistical 
procedures have to be used in order to detect ‘patterns o f behaviour’.
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The research may be done within the context o f academic departments in 
university faculties o f medicine, or in industrial laboratories e.g. the pharmaceu­
tical industry, but all these researchers would identify themselves as natural scien­
tists and their work as exemplifying the methodological directives o f the natural 
sciences. This is the basis o f their claim to being ‘scientific’ M ost o f these disci­
plines are laboratory based and are often referred to as the basic sciences -  i.e. 
basic to clinical medicine, which is seen as ‘an applied science’.
The term m edical science also includes scientific research done in clinical dis­
ciplines usually within the context o f university hospitals related to medical 
schools. This research consists mainly in applying the theories and knowledge 
generated by basic science research to the clinical situation in order to test the va­
lidity or applicability in the clinical situation. However, such research may gene­
rate its own type o f knowledge system especially regarding clinical manifes­
tations, diagnostic methods and criteria, therapeutic regimes, risk factor identifi­
cation, etc.
This research is usually done as an integral part o f clinical practice (hence patient 
fears o f being ‘human guinea pigs’). Many clinical researchers have their own la­
boratories attached to their wards, or work in the laboratories o f their basic 
science colleagues, while many ‘basic scientists’ are qualified medical practi­
tioners. The distinction between basic science research and clinical research is 
therefore not clear cut, but both see themselves as ‘natural scientists’.
Although the practice o f clinical medicine involves persons, the research assump­
tion o f scientific medicine is that clinical research can be done as if  the researcher 
is dealing with the same domain as is dealt with in the natural sciences.
Clinical researchers therefore go to extraordinary lengths to eliminate any refe­
rence to the human subject on which and by which the research is being done in 
order to obtain ‘objectively valid’ knowledge.
Such objectively valid knowledge is thought to be obtainable, e.g. by the use of 
the so-called placebo controlled double blind cross over therapeutic trials which 
attempt not only to eliminate researcher and patient bias, but also the so-called 
placebo effect i.e. the biological effect o f interpersonal relationships and other 
non-physical factors.
This methodology is used to compare the therapeutic efficacy o f  a new drug or 
therapeutic regime against that o f the presently accepted regimes and/or against 
that o f a ‘placebo’. A placebo is a pharmacologically inactive substance which is 
administered as if  it were a pharmacologically active agent. The ‘placebo effect’ 
measures the degree to which doctor-patient interaction affects the patients’ 
response in terms o f subjective feelings o f well-being. This is especially impor­
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tant where the patients’ responses are an important criterion for assessing the 
agent. The ideal is to dispense completely with patient responses and only to 
measure objective indicators o f disease such as biochemical or histological 
changes. The assumption is that the body is a machine in which the ‘personal do­
main’ cannot affect the responses of the machine.
The concept o f double blind  means that neither the patient nor the doctor knows 
whether the patient is receiving the agent being tested or the placebo. C ross over  
refers to the fact that half way through the trial those patients who were on place­
bo start receiving the agent, and vice versa. Those researchers who know which 
agent is being administered to whom, do not come into contact with the patients 
at all.
Medical science is thus practised within the context o f a large number of disci­
plines which are considered to fall within the ambit o f the physical sciences, the 
biological sciences and the medical sciences. This scientific practice is guided by 
the natural science paradigm, which could thus be said to be the theory which 
guides the practice. The term theory  used in this sense obviously means some­
thing different to ‘theory’ as a symbolic knowledge system generated by scientific 
activity. It is really a meta-theory.
We have now reached the point where we can analyse the relationship between 
theory and practice as it presents itself in the medical profession as well as the 
relationship between the natural science paradigm and the clinical practice of 
medicine.
4. Scientific medical practice: the medical profession
4.1 Clinical practice as scientific practice
Clinical medicine as a system of healing distinguishes itself from other systems of 
medicine on the basis that it, and it alone, is ‘scientific’. Other systems o f medi­
cine such as homoeopathy, chiropractic, traditional medicine etc. are considered 
to be non-scientific, and therefore o f no practical importance in health care.
The basis for the claim to being a scientific practice is twofold: Clinical practice 
is viewed as the direct application o f ‘scientific knowledge’ (scientific being un­
derstood as natural science) and the clinical method is seen as resembling ‘the 
scientific method’.
* Clinical practice as the application of scientific knowledge
Clinical practice is considered to be scientific because it applies the scientific 
know ledge (theories) generated by medical science in its varying institutional for­
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mats as set out in section 3. The term science is therefore understood as ‘natural 
science’ and the meaning given to the central terms o f medicine namely disease, 
therapy, patient, etc. will be the same as in medical science.
Certain aspects o f medical practice may be known to be based on very scanty or 
very doubtful ‘scientific knowledge’, but the ideal is to base clinical practice on 
‘sound scientific principles’. It is assumed that the domain o f clinical practice is 
identical (or sufficiently identical) with the ‘research domain’ of ‘medical 
science’ (as described above) for this to be done. Clinical medicine is thus as­
sumed to be a direct application of a body o f (discipline based) natural scientific 
knowledge. Natural science (in the form of medical science) therefore supplies 
‘the theories’, and clinical medicine applies them to patient care.
* The clinical method represents the scientific method
The interaction between the scientific doctor and the patient is regulated by a 
specific method known as ‘the clinical method’. According to this method the 
doctor first systematically interrogates the patient regarding his or her symptoms 
(the subjective experiences of ‘being ill’ as well as other information regarding 
family history, work history, social habits that may have a bearing on the still-to- 
be-diagnosed disease). This process is known as ‘history taking’. From this in­
formation the physician formulates a hypothesis regarding the possible disease or 
diseases that may cause the symptoms.
The history is followed by ‘the physical examination’ in order to find physical 
signs that will confirm or disconfirm the hypothesis. Physical signs are ‘objective 
physical findings’ e.g. enlargement of the liver, signs o f anaemia, the presence of 
abnormal heart sounds, etc.
This is usually followed by special investigations of e.g. the blood or urine, or X- 
ray examination, etc. The aim is now finally to find objective evidence of disease, 
i.e. o f abnormal physical processes. Without such objective evidence, there is no 
disease, regardless o f the patient’s story. In these cases the concepts o f neurosis 
or psychosomatic complaints are invoked. The ‘objective evidence’ may be bio­
chemical or anatomical (X-rays, biopsies), immunological, etc. The disease label 
is the one that best links together the history, the physical examination and the 
special investigation. This disease label is o f vital importance, because it deter­
mines therapy. However, a disease is not simply a label, it is something that 
actually exists objectively.
From this description it can be seen that the clinical method presupposes the 
whole set o f assumptions and beliefs that were described above as the biomedical 
model.
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The application o f the clinical method through which a diagnosis is established 
and a decision regarding therapy is made in the case o f an individual patient, is 
considered to be an exemplar of (natural) scientific rationality, and is e.g. likened 
to the ‘scientific process’ o f data collection followed by hypothesis formulation 
and hypothesis testing.
The analytic process by which clinical information leads to the diagnosis is 
closely akin to the scientific method -  the process whereby experimentation 
leads to the discovery o f new knowledge (Harvey et a i ,  1984:2).
Although the actual position o f Harvey et al. (1984) is much more nuanced than 
that suggested by this quotation, there are two assumptions operative under the 
surface o f this model o f clinical reasoning. The first is that ‘the scientific method’ 
is an analytical one and secondly, the assumption that the clinical reasoning pro­
cess is (or can be) modeled on the ‘scientific rationality’ of the research process. 
In this case too the term scientific is understood as natural science.
4.2 T h e in stitu tionalized  form s o f  m edical p ractice
The medical profession is institutionalized as a large variety o f clinical specialties 
such as surgery, paediatrics, internal medicine, obstetrics and gynaecology, fa­
mily medicine, psychiatry, oncology and radiotherapy, etc. However, the labo­
ratory specialties such as chemical pathology, virology, histopathology, medical 
microbiology, nuclear medicine, etc. as well as the community specialities such as 
community medicine and epidemiology, are considered to be part o f scientific 
medical practice. Although aspects o f the last two may be dealt with by ‘pure 
scientists’ they are mostly practised by medical graduates.
Each o f these forms o f practice has its own ‘theory’ in the sense that e.g. a psy­
chiatrist would not be able to handle the practice of a surgeon -  and by that I do 
not only refer to the specialized skills. The psychiatrist would be lost in the 
theory that informs the practice. But ‘theory’ here simply refers to the scienti­
fically generated knowledge base which is applied in the clinical, laboratory or 
community practice.
But what then makes them examples o f a common practice called medical prac­
tice?
* They all have a direct or indirect dealing with the phenomenon o f disease -  
diagnosis, treatment, prevention, rehabilitation. But this indicates that they 
must have a common concept o f disease. ‘Disease’ is not a concept with a 
self-evident meaning, it obtains its meaning from a wider ‘theory of disease’. 
This meaning is supplied by biomedicine.
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* Registration with the Medical and Dental Council. It is this registration in a 
specific category of practice that gives a medical practitioner the legal right 
to practise his or her specific branch o f medicine.
* But this common registration is based upon a common education. All me­
dical practitioners go through the same undergraduate education. Following 
this basic education a further period o f specialization is required. It is 
success in the educational programme that allows registration. But the edu­
cational programme must be legitimated by the Council, so these two (edu­
cation and registration) are really aspects o f the same process. Only that 
which is taught at medical faculties is ‘science’ and only those who have 
undergone the social process o f training and examinations at such faculties, 
may participate (Verbruch, 1974:46). But this educational process too pre­
supposes the whole framework o f biomedicine (Kriel & Friedman, 1990).
4.3 Theory and practice in the medical profession
The theory for the practice o f medicine is thus supplied by the science of 
medicine. This theory is the output o f the enterprise o f medical science which is 
a paradigmatic interaction between researchers and their research domain. The 
paradigm in question is the natural science paradigm.
The natural science paradigm as applied to medical science is called biom edicine. 
Biomedicine thus forms the meta-theory which regulates both the practice of 
medicine and the practice o f medical education. Medical education thus repro­
duces the biomedical paradigm. These relationships can be set out diagrammati- 
cally as in figure 2.
A final question needs to be addressed. What is the research domain o f medical 
science?
Researchers approaching ostensibly the same reality from the perspective o f  dif­
ferent paradigms, ‘see’ different realities. The research domain is thus partly pos­
tulated or established or, at the very least structured, by the research paradigm.
So what is the research domain of medical science? Is it health, or is it the ill 
person, or is it biological deviations from the norm called diseases? From what 
was said above, it is clear that the research domain o f biomedicine is specifically 
biological deviations from the norm. It is not the whole field of health and illness.
210 Koers 59(2) 199-1:193-219
Jacques R. Kriel & Pieter van I 'euren
Figure 2: The relationship between the natural science paradigm, scientific 
medicine, medical practice and medical education
This has important implications because the medical profession projects itself as 
the sole societal interpreter o f the field of health and illness while in fact its 
theories (which form the basis for medical practice) have a very limited appli­
cation. Furthermore, its institutions guard the paradigmatic monism o f the natural 
science paradigm with all the scientific and political power at its disposal.
4.4 Conclusion
The standard view of medical science as a natural science which shares the 
ontological and methodological beliefs o f the natural sciences as a group, thus 
fundamentally influences medical science and medical practice. Medical practice 
sees itself (in the form o f the social institution of the medical profession) as 
applying the medical knowledge o f medical science. The output o f the research 
activity o f medical science is a theoretical symbolic system which at the same 
time acts as the ‘theory’ for the ‘practice o f medicine’. The monistic paradig­
matic framework of medical science, therefore also forms the paradigmatic frame­
work (or meta-theory) for medical practice.
Schon (1987:1-40) has criticized what he calls the positivistic theory of practice 
which assumes that practice is nothing more than the application o f ‘scientific 
theories’. He points out that in professional practice the professional is not faced 
with clear cut problems as defined by the scientific paradigm, but by messy 
situations out o f which a problem must be constructed. Basically this means that 
the ‘research domain’ of the natural sciences never is (or can be?) co-extensive 
with the reality within which practice takes place. If practice is approached
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solely from the perspective o f the natural science paradigm, then a significant 
area o f the real world is excluded from the interaction between the professional 
and her client.
5. Biom edicine and the AIDS epidemic: a case study
In this section I wish to illustrate very briefly the limitations o f the biomedical 
model in dealing with the problem o f the AIDS epidemic. I will focus mainly on 
the implications of the biomedical understanding o f the cause o f AIDS. For a 
more detailed discussion o f the relationship between the biomedical point o f view 
and AIDS, see Kriel (1991).
5.1 The biomedical view of AIDS
In line with the biomedical definition o f disease, AIDS is seen exclusively as 
pathology in an organ system (the immune system) caused by a physical agent, 
the HI virus. All research efforts (and funding) are focused on finding a physical 
cure (e.g. a drug) or a physical form o f prevention (e.g. a vaccine or promotion of 
condom use).
Sexual behaviour is seen as a risk factor -  it is not seen as an essential aspect o f 
the disease or o f its causation. Very little attention is given to the nature of sexual 
relations as a human phenomenon. Sexuality, in turn, is interpreted as being 
simply a biological phenomenon explicable in terms o f hormones and instinctual 
drives (whatever that means!). The social and cultural context (i.e. the human) 
context o f sexuality is considered to be a private matter falling outside the scope 
of science. I contend that this biological model o f sexuality not only distorts our 
understanding o f human sexuality, but also that o f animal sexuality.
This model o f AIDS is not wrong, it is simply scientifically inadequate -  using 
‘science’ in its widest context as defined in the Introduction. But how does this 
inadequate model affect our approach to the epidemic? 1 will attempt to answer 
this question by focusing on the the aetiology (causation) o f AIDS. I will argue 
that AIDS is not caused by the HI virus, but by the HI virus within the context o f 
a specific pattern of sexual behaviour that I will call ‘open sexual relations’. 
Because the cause of the disease is not simply a physical factor, finding a phy­
sical cure or preventative strategy will therefore not break the epidemic. Finding 
a ‘solution’ to the epidemic requires a much more holistic approach than that of­
fered by biomedicine.
5.2 The cause of AIDS
All sexually transmitted diseases (there are about 30 that afflict our species) have 
one characteristic in common, namely that they are dependent for their spread
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from person to person on the most intimate form o f contact between two 
individuals o f a species, namely sexual intercourse. The reason for this is that the 
causative organisms are very ‘w eak’ organisms that are extremely sensitive to 
any exposure to the environment. Modem technology has made it possible for 
some o f these organisms to spread from person to person through blood to blood 
contact, e.g. through the sharing o f infected needles by intravenous drug users, or 
through infected blood transfusions. However, these methods are essentially 
‘transmission artifacts’ that can initiate an infection, but cannot sustain an epi­
demic. I will now demonstrate that an epidemic o f sexually transmitted diseases 
can only be maintained through the presence of a specific type of sexual 
behaviour within a community. Some sexually transmitted diseases, e.g. Hepa­
titis B, can spread by other means as well, but AIDS is for all practical purposes 
an obligatory sexually transmitted disease i.e. it is entirely dependent on sexual 
transmission in order to initiate and maintain an epidemic.
5.3 The cause of AIDS: behaviour as causation
Both human and animal sexual behaviour is a very complex phenomenon. Most 
descriptive categories used for describing sexual behaviour have an ethical bias. 
Terms such as m oral, immoral, prom iscuous, f id e lity  etc. are, I believe, not 
useful in dealing with an empirical issue. Terms such as homo- or heterosexual, 
celibate, m onogam y  and polygam y  are empirically descriptive terms for the 
structure o f sexual relations and have been involved in the description o f the 
causality o f AIDS. So, e.g. AIDS was initially considered to be a ‘homosexual 
disease’. It has now, however, become clear that AIDS has no essential rela­
tionship to homosexuality at all (see Saayman & Kriel, 1992:22). In fact, the 
epidemic is decreasing in many homosexual communities but exploding in the 
heterosexual community. Are there other descriptive categories available?
In animal communities living under natural circumstances, sexually transmitted 
diseases are a very rare occurrence. Sexual behaviour in animal communities is 
usually described as ‘free’ or as ‘promiscuous’. This is a complete misperception 
o f animal sexuality. In nature sex is not only dangerous (many males lose their 
lives during the mating season and few survive without permanent scars!) but 
sexuality is very strictly controlled both hormonally and by species’ specific 
mating behaviour patterns. Sex in nature is for gene selection, not for enjoyment!
The actual level o f sexual activity is very low. Outside the mating season there is 
no sexual activity and males and females often live in separate communities while 
most o f the mating season is spent on territorial delimitation and mate selection. 
But this alone cannot account for the low incidence o f sexually transmitted 
diseases in nature.
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I would like to suggest that this phenomenon can be explained by the hypothesis 
that the function o f species’ specific mating behaviour is not simply gene selec­
tion, but the setting up o f small temporary communities o f closed sexual relations 
and that it is the presence o f closed sexual relations that explains the absence of 
sexually transmitted diseases in nature.
If  closed sexual relations do prevent the spread of sexually transmitted diseases, 
there would be sound evolutionary reasons why the procreational dynamics in 
nature should favour the establishment o f closed sexual relations. The presence 
o f sexually transmitted diseases in a natural community would decrease its 
procreational potential (e.g. through sterility and abortion) so that natural 
selection would favour those communities whose mating behaviour tended 
towards closed sexual behaviour patterns which exclude the possibility of 
sexually transmitted diseases.
The point o f the argument is that a prerequisite for the existence of sexually 
transmitted diseases in a particular animal (or human) community is the presence 
o f open sexual relations, because closed sexual relations make it impossible for 
any specific sexually transmitted disease to propagate itself in the community, 
and provides social immunity to the spread o f the disease. So what is meant by 
closed sexual relations and how do they prevent the transmission o f sexually 
transmitted diseases?
F igure 3: Exam ples of closed sexual relations: (i) M onogam ous hetero­
sexual (ii) M onogam ous hom osexual (iii) Polygam ous (iv) T roop 
(v) C elibate
By a closed sexual relationship is meant a relationship in which sexual intercourse 
is limited strictly to the partners involved in the relationship. Such a closed 
sexual community may be structured along monogamous lines, or it may be po­
lygamous (see Figure 3). It may be heterosexual or homosexual or celibate. The 
deciding factor is that the sexual partners remain absolutely loyal to one another, 
or remain celibate. Masturbation could therefore be seen as a form o f closed 
sexual relations.
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The term open sexual relationship  does not simply refer to multiple sexual part­
ners, but where one of the partners in an otherwise stable relationship has sexual 
contact with a partner outside that relationship. A polygamous marriage is there­
fore not an open relationship. It only becomes so if one of the partners (male or 
female) has an ‘outside relationship’. The sexual relations in animal troops, herds 
or other natural groupings (e.g. o f chimpanzees), are often described as open be­
cause an oestrous female will mate with several o f the males in the troop. How­
ever, the sexual relations are limited to that specific troop, and is thus ‘closed’. It 
is an extended form o f the human polygamous relationship.
In Figure 3 the boxes indicate that the infecting organism of any sexually 
transmitted diseases (including the HI virus in the case o f AIDS) cannot enter into 
a closed relationship or, if  it happens to have entered (e.g. via an infected blood 
transfusion), it cannot get out again into the community to initiate or maintain an 
epidemic. That is why it was stated earlier that transmission o f the HI virus by 
blood transfusions and infected syringes or needles are ‘transmission artifacts’. 
They may initiate an isolated infection, but cannot maintain an epidemic in any 
community in which closed sexual relationships are the norm.
Figure 4: Open hetero- and homosexual relations including a bisexual 
relationship. The open boxes indicate relatively permanent relationships.
Figure 4 shows a situation o f open heterosexual and homosexual relationships, 
including a bisexual relationship. From Figure 4 three conclusions can be drawn.
* One partner in many o f these relationships could believe that he or she is in­
volved in a closed relationship.
* AIDS has no intrinsic relationship to homosexuality. The crucial factor is 
not whether sexual relations are homo- or heterosexual, but whether they are 
closed or open.
* It shows that the HI virus can theoretically infect the whole community 
practising open sexual relations.
The minimum causal equation for the AIDS epidemic is therefore: the presence 
o f the HI vims + open sexual relationships.
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The virus is therefore not the (only) pathogenic (disease causing) agent in the 
production of AIDS. It rather triggers action in something that is not a simple 
object (e.g. a body), but a pattern o f relations, an integrated circuit or an eco­
logical web o f relationships. Only in combination with way-of-life factors affec­
ting the host -  in this case a way o f life characterized by open sexual relations -  
can the virus be said to cause the disease. It is therefore simply unscientific to 
maintain that the cause o f AIDS is the HI virus. The only scientifically valid 
statement about the cause of AIDS is that it is caused by the HI virus in the 
presence o f open sexual relations. (This principle is true not only o f sexually 
transmitted diseases, but o f many categories o f disease.)
A community which practises closed sexual relations could be said to have social 
immunity against HIV infection. From this it is clear that the statement used in 
AIDS education campaigns ‘Anyone can get AIDS’ is simply not true, and is 
misinforming the public about the real causal relationships.
5.4 On cures, vaccines and condoms
By pleading that we must go beyond the biomedical view, I am not denying the 
importance of seeking a cure or vaccine, but even from a biomedical perspective, 
there are immense ethical, technical, cultural and economic problems facing re­
searchers and health workers in developing these strategies. While we wait for 
biomedical research to deliver the goods the epidemic is escalating -  and the most 
hopeful predictions talk about a decade or more before a ‘breakthrough’ can be 
expected.
But even if an effective and safe curative drug is discovered tomorrow, it will 
make no difference to the epidemic. It will o f course make a difference to the 
survival o f individual patients, but in terms o f the epidemic it represents essen­
tially a mopping up operation which does not affect the primary mechanism main­
taining the epidemic, namely the sexual behaviour patterns of populations. It will 
be o f benefit to the rich in the rich nations o f the world, but for Africa it will be of 
very little benefit at all. Confirmation o f this pessimistic view o f  the value o f a 
curative drug is found in analysing the present worldwide epidemic of syphilis 
and other sexually transmitted diseases.
For syphilis and gonorrhoea a cheap and very effective ‘miracle cure’ is available 
in the form o f penicillin, but the incidence graph for these diseases shows the 
same logarithmic increase as that o f AIDS. This is understandable because these 
diseases are dependent on the same behaviour patterns for their transmission as 
the HI virus. Therefore, unless we find a means o f stopping transmission o f  the 
virus, discovery o f a drug or other miracle cure will have no effect on the epide­
mic, especially in Africa, but also in other continents.
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And what about a vaccine? Because the HI virus is limited to man, the possibility 
is there for an effective vaccine to eliminate it from the earth as was done (so the 
virologists assure us) in the case of the smallpox virus. But I believe that the 
biological, social, cultural, economic and epidemiological context or ecology of 
the AIDS epidemic differs so vastly from that o f smallpox, that the same biomedi­
cal strategies will not work.
Apart from the economic and ethical problems in developing, testing and imple­
menting a vaccine, there is the problem of antigenic drift which enables the virus 
to change its antigenic structure against which the vaccine acts. The possibility of 
the virus changing its antigenic profile increases with the rate o f transmission. 
Therefore, for a vaccine to be effectively deployed we need to decrease dras­
tically the rate o f transmission o f the virus -  which brings us right back into the 
field o f human behaviour.
We are therefore in a classical Catch 22 situation: the biomedical strategies that 
are being proposed in order to break the epidemic (and millions o f Rand are 
poured into research efforts to actualize them), all require the epidemic to be bro­
ken for them to become effective. However, the obvious point in the causal net­
work at which the epidemic can be attacked, namely ‘open sexual relations’ is ig­
nored (or is considered to be an interim measure until a ‘medical breakthrough’ is 
made) in policy planning as well as research funding.
This leaves condoms and programmes for promoting ‘safer sex’. That condoms 
provide some protection against the transfer o f the vims, is undeniable. But con­
doms leak and burst, and unless they are of very good quality (and thus very ex­
pensive) the virus can actually pass through the mesh. However, a much greater 
problem is the fact that the acceptance of the use of condoms depends on cultural 
factors that are specifically excluded by the biomedical model. Furthermore, the 
same attitudinal, social, cultural, economic and personal factors that underlie the 
open sexual behaviour patterns that maintain the epidemic, also militate against 
the use o f condoms. Condoms form a vital part o f the strategy, but again only in 
a situation in which the epidemic is under control -  promoting condom usage will 
not bring the epidemic under control.
In homo sapiens the biological control o f sexuality has disappeared. Sexuality is 
stimulated by the mind and the biological controls o f sexuality have been replaced 
by social (cultural and religious) controls. These controls are by their very nature 
‘softer’ control systems, and open sexual relations have probably been part o f 
mankind’s history since the very beginning. In Proverbs 5:15 large sections deal 
with the dangers o f the adulteress and the wayward wife and the advice (to the 
males!) is: "Drink water from your own cisterns, running water from your own 
well."
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Human sexual behaviour is therefore more strongly influenced by socio-cultural 
and economic factors than by biological factors. Any breakdown in these spheres 
will also impact on sexual behaviour.
Although the major religions o f Africa, as well as the major African cultural 
traditions, promote closed sexual relations, these controls were devastated by the 
impact o f colonialism and the postcolonial wars. Western materialism and secu­
larism with the attendant ethical and cultural relativism have taken their toll. 
Migrant labour, which has formed an integral part o f apartheid but has also cha­
racterized labour practices in the rest o f Africa as well as Europe, has devastated 
family life and made closed sexual relations for practical purposes impossible for 
large sections o f the population. Religions cannot promote closed sexual rela­
tions without addressing these factors at the same time.
On the other hand there are cultural traditions that favour and support open sexual 
relations. These have equally to be addressed whether they are based in the libe­
ral sexual ethic or in the ethos of patriarchal societies (Cullen, 1991).
We therefore need to go beyond negative approaches and seek to understand and 
address the root causes o f open sexual relations. In fact, in spite o f  the near ob­
session with sexuality in the modem world, we have very little understanding of 
human sexuality except in terms of an (inadequate) biological model. We need to 
understand the essential nature of human sexuality. From this understanding we 
can then address and confront the problems o f the relationship between sex and 
marriage, the problem o f sexuality and the single person, masturbation as a form 
o f sexual practice, the problem of sex education of teenagers etc. All o f this will 
require a thorough understanding o f sexuality as a specifically human phenome­
non, its power and its controls. Various religions and cultural traditions will need 
to work together, because sexuality and AIDS know no cultural or religious boun­
daries.
5.7 Conclusion
Sexuality and AIDS are not phenomena that can be understood or managed 
purely as physical biological phenomena. The insight that closed sexual relations 
is an essential feature o f sexuality in nature and open sexual relations an essential 
aspect o f the causality o f AIDS has two very important implications:
* We need to find ways of helping individuals and communities establish 
closed sexual relations as the norm. This will require, amongst others, inten­
sive funding o f research into factors contributing to open sexual relations 
and into the most effective ways and means o f promoting c lo sed  sexual re ­
lations. At present, guided by the limited understanding o f causality provi­
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ded by the biomedical paradigm, all the research funding goes into research­
ing only one half o f the causal equation.
The Christian community (in cooperation with other religious communities) has a 
vital role to play, but it will have to go far beyond the present negative and 
legalistic attitude towards sexuality. The Teacher o f Proverbs (5:18-20) advises 
his sons: may you rejoice in the wife o f your youth. .. may her breasts satisfy 
you always, may you ever be captivated by her love". In the modem society with 
all its pressures towards sexual openness, this requires more from the community 
than pious good wishes or legalistic prescriptions.
* Religious communities are free to take up AIDS sufferers into a loving and 
caring community. There is no risk of infection to the community at all. In 
the light of the predicted pressure on the health services, religious communi­
ties will have to become involved in the home care o f AIDS sufferers, and of 
the care o f orphans.
At present, however, there is little indication that the Christian churches recog­
nize the urgency o f the situation or the vastness o f the challenge before it.
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